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ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS: IMPROVING
PUBLIC PERCEPTION AND INCREASING
EFCACY
I. INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin newspapers followed the controversy last fall: "Discipline
Board Said to Need More Non-Lawyers, "1 "Board on Lawyers Reaches
Out to Public; Disciplinary Unit Acts to Adopt a Consumer-Oriented
Approach,"2 "Panel Urges Reform in Lawyer Discipline,, 3 "Court
Wants to Hear on Lawyer Board,, 4 and "Don't Kill Lawyer Review
Board."5  The controversy over lawyer discipline isn't unique to
Wisconsin, 6 nor is it unique to our time.' At the heart of these headlines
and similar debates is the question of how to structure the legal
profession's self-regulation to best protect both the profession and the
public it serves.
Serving the legal profession and protecting the public are not
disparate goals; each is served by effective attorney discipline systems.
The debate is structural; it involves allocation of the investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within discipline systems
among the judiciary, the public, and organized bar associations. Points
at issue include whether self-regulation adequately protects the public,
whether public protection measures such as public participation
adequately protect innocent attorneys, and which participants in the
1. Richard P. Jones, Discipline Board Said to Need More Non-Lawyers, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 15,1999, at 1.
2. Cary Segall, Board on Lawyers Reaches Out to Public; Disciplinary Unit Acts to
Adopt a More Consumer-Oriented Approach, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 14,1999, at lB.
3. Richard P. Jones, Panel Urges Reform in Lawyer Discipline, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Sept. 13,1999, at 2.
4. Court Wants to Hear on Lawyer Board, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 16,1999, at 3B.
5. Don't Kill Lawyer Review Board, Wis. ST. J., Sept. 15, 1999, at 11A.
6. See Michael P. Ambrosio & Denis F. McLaughlin, The Redefining of Professional
Ethics in New Jersey Under Chief Robert Wilentz: A Legacy of Reform, 7 SETON HALL
CONST. LJ. 351 (1997); Lawrence A. Dubin, How the Michigan Supreme Court Can Better
Protect the Public From Bad Lawyers: The Ball is in Their Court, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
667 (1996); Bumele Venable Powell, Diagnosis and Prescription: Illusory Lawyer Disciplinary
Reform and the Need for a Moratorium, 1 J. INST. STUD. FOR LEGAL ETHICS 263 (1996).
7. See ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Lawyer Regulation For a New Century:
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992)
[hereinafter MCKAY REPORT].
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system are most fit to make these decisions.8 This Comment addresses
current criticisms of attorney discipline systems, offering in Part II a
model system. The model system includes independent state discipline
boards that maintain separate committees to address prosecutorial and
adjudicative functions, under the supervision of the state's highest court.
Part III surveys several types of discipline systems, including those of
other professions, with particular attention to allocation of investigative,
adjudicative and prosecutorial functions among various players within
the system. Part IV highlights criticisms of state discipline boards at
both the national and state levels. Part V addresses these criticisms with
suggestions: central intake systems for receiving complaints and public
participation in the systems.
II. ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF STATE ATrORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
A. Judicial Control
Although legislative regulation of the legal profession has been
periodically suggested,9 judicial regulation of attorney discipline systems
"is a principle firmly established in every state."10 The American Bar
Association supports judicial regulation, as noted in Recommendation
One of the 1992 McKay Report, which states that "[r]egulation of the
legal profession should remain under the authority of the judicial branch
of government."" The ABA finds that judicial control offers better
protection to the public 2 and allows the disciplinary system to operate
independent of the political pressure that would accompany legislative
control. 3
This recommendation has been emphasized repeatedly by the
ABA. In 1979, the ABA Joint Committee on Professional Discipline
promulgated the need for politically independent disciplinary
commissions, stating, "[tihe commission should be independent of and
free from interference from the executive or legislative branches and,
8. See, e.g., Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note 6; Dubin, supra note 6.
9. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 2-3.
10. Id. at 2.
11. Id. at 1.
12. See id. at 4.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See, e.g., ABA NAT'L CTR. FOR PROF. RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, Professional Discipline for Lawyers and Judges, 21
(1979) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE].
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although operating within the judicial branch, should report only to the
supreme court."" The Second Recommendation of the McKay Report is
entitled, "Supporting Judicial Regulation and Professional
Responsibility." '16 Support of judicial control over attorney discipline
has a long history and is likely to be included in future reports as a
necessary component of effective attorney discipline systems.
The need for judicial control of attorney discipline has been
recognized in specific states as discipline systems are re-evaluated. For
example, in 1990, greater involvement by the Michigan Supreme Court
in that state's system was suggested to prevent improprieties occurring
under the then present system. 7 A recent national critique of attorney
discipline systems finds that insufficient judicial review of discipline
decisions and the attending deference to decisions made by attorneys
operating the systems allow attorneys to improperly exercise
discretion. Judicial control of discipline systems offers a balance of
control by insulating the legal profession from the political pressures
inherent in regulation by the legislative or executive branches and
concentrating supervision in a body with less incentive than trade
associations to protect individual members of the profession.
B. Separation of the Prosecutorial and Adjudicative Functions
The ABA recommends a unitary system under the supervision of the
state's highest court in which disciplinary counsel perform the
investigative and prosecutorial functions, and the adjudicative function
is handled by hearing committee members, disciplinary board members,
and members of the court. 9 The prosecutorial staff and adjudicative
staff should function separately, as noted in Recommendation 6.2:
The Court should adopt a rule providing that no disciplinary
adjudicative official (including hearing committee members,
disciplinary board members, or members of the Court) shall
communicate ex parte with disciplinary counsel regarding an
ongoing investigation or disciplinary matter, except about
administrative matters or to report information alleging the
15. Id.
16. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.
17. See Dubin, supra note 6, at 669.
18. See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 1,10-11 (1998).
19. See id. at 29. See also ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, Survey of Lawyer
Disciplinary Procedures in the United States, 2 (1984).
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
misconduct of a lawyer.20
This recommendation has also been found in ABA reports since
1979. Recommendation 3.2 of the 1979 report states:
Separation of Prosecutorial and Adjudicative Functions. The
agency should be a unitary entity. While it should perform both
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, these functions should
be separated within the agency insofar as practicable. The
prosecutorial functions should be directed by a lawyer employed
full-time by the agency and performed, insofar as practicable, by
employees of the agency. The adjudicative functions should be
performed by practicing lawyers and public members.21
The recommendation is broad enough to encompass various
disciplinary system structures, and is generally followed by state
discipline systems.' The reasons for this recommendation are obvious.
There is an inherent conflict of interest in performance of these
functions by the same actors within the disciplinary system, analogous to
allowing adjudication by a District Attorney in a criminal prosecution.23
The importance of separate prosecutorial and adjudicative functions
is well-accepted, and discipline systems are criticized for failure to
adhere to this principle. In the 1970s, for example, the Michigan State
Bar Grievance Board was attacked for officially performing both
functions, which resulted in the creation of a bifurcated system in that
state.2' The Attorney Grievance Commission was then responsible for
investigation and prosecution while the Attorney Discipline Board was
delegated adjudicative responsibilities.'
20. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 29.
21. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 14, at 82-83.
22. See ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, National Survey of Attorney Discipline
Systems (1996).
23. For discussion of the nature and structure of attorney discipline systems as civil,
criminal, or quasi-criminal, see Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The Revised Lawyer Discipline
Process in Arkansas: A Primer and Analysis, 21 U. ARK. LI~rLE ROCK L. REV. 13 (1998);
Joseph Frank Strength, Comment, Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings: Civil or Criminal in
Nature?, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 257 (1995); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,
105 HARV. L REV. 799 (1992).
24. See Dubin, supra note 6, at 669. For an interesting note on the handling of
constitutional claims within the Michigan system, see Marcy A. Hahn, Note, The
Constitutionality of Michigan's Attorney Discipline System, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1565 (1997).
25. See Dubin, supra note 6.
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More recently in Wisconsin, criticism of the discipline system
resulted from claims that members of the Board of Attorney
Professional Responsibility, which exercises prosecutorial discretion,
contacted members of the investigative staff directly regarding
administrative matters 6 While this example involves prosecutors
contacting investigative staff, it illustrates the importance of maintaining
separation between functions in a discipline system. Contact or
association between prosecutors and adjudicators would be deemed an
even more egregious compromise of impartiality within any discipline
system.
Separation of prosecution and adjudication within state discipline
systems promotes a balanced process in two ways: it represents the
interests of both the public and the attorneys under investigation and
allows participation by a variety of groups, reducing the opportunities
for error based on partiality. This check on attorney discipline systems
is vital in ensuring that discipline systems protect both the public and the
legal profession.
C. Adjudication Independent of State Bar Associations
While State Bar Associations are generally involved in the
administration of state discipline systems, it is important that systems
remain under the ultimate control of the judiciary. It is likewise
necessary to avoid ultimate adjudication solely by members of state bar
associations, which are viewed as biased because of their role as trade
associations.
The ABA addresses the role of the state bar in Recommendation
Five of the McKay Report, relating to the Independence of Disciplinary
Officials.' The recommendation clarifies that the control of the system
should be under the supreme court, and Recommendation 5.1 states that
"[e]lected bar officials, their appointees and employees should provide
only administrative and other services for the disciplinary system that
support the operation of the system without impairing the independence
of disciplinary officials."28 The comments to the recommendation clarify
that there are many roles for the bar and its officials within the system,
but not as adjudicators: "[A] lawyer can appropriately serve the
profession as an elected bar official and as an appointed disciplinary
26. State Bar of Wisconsin BAPR Study Committee Report to the Board of Governors,
June 3,1999 (on file with the author).
27. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7.
28. Id. at 24.
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
adjudicator-but not simultaneously. '" 29 The position of the ABA does
not exclude state bar officials altogether from the disciplinary process,
but focuses on the conflict of interest between the leadership in a trade
association and the regulation of its members.'
The conflict of interest in adjudication by state bar associations is
noted within the profession. In California, a 1985 task force on that
state's disciplinary process found that the state bar association, as both a
trade association and a disciplinary agency, could not regulate
effectively based on the conflict of interest inherent in performance of
both roles." The task force subsequently recommended implementation
of an independent regulatory authority under the control of the state
supreme court.32 Leslie C. Levin also points to the discretion of the bar
in adjudication as a weakness of disciplinary systems: "The absence of
[clear disciplinary] standards leaves the sanctioning decisions largely to
the discretion of the bar, which remains heavily involved in the
discipline process. '" 33 Levin suggests that standards for imposition of
disciplinary sanctions would counter this effect.'
In Michigan, the attorney discipline system was removed from the
control of the state bar association in the early 1970s, with results that
were viewed positively by the public and other critics of the previously
low discipline rates.35 In the two years following the change, the newly
created State Bar Grievance Board, under the control of the Michigan
Supreme Court, disciplined more lawyers than the state-bar controlled
discipline system had in the preceding thirty-five years.3 To the
skeptical public, increased numbers of discipline cases meant greater
protection from inappropriate treatment by lawyers. As discussed
29. Id. at 25.
30. For criticism of the unified bar's administration of the discipline system, see Bradley
A. Smith, The Limits of Compulsory Professionalism: How the Unified Bar Harms the Legal
Profession, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35 (1994). Smith suggests that voluntary bar associations
are more effective and make better use of funds than do unified bar associations. Smith
further argues that attorney discipline should be handled by state agencies rather than by the
unified bar under the direction of the state's supreme court, citing the Ohio system as an
example. For a critique of the Ohio system, see Jack A. Guttenberg, The Ohio Attorney
Disciplinary Process-1982 to 1991: An Empirical Study, Critique, and Recommendations for
Change, 62 U. CON. L. REV. 947 (1994).
31. See William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-
Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 485,551 (1995).
32. See id.
33. Levin, supra note 18, at 10.
34. See iL
35. See Dubin, supra note 6, at 669.
36. Id.
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previously, it is essential that control of disciplinary systems remain
under the judiciary.' While state bar associations are a valuable
resource in implementation of such systems, performance of the
adjudicative function by state bar associations may result in biased
decisions and public distrust s
The recommendations for effective attorney discipline discussed
herein involve proper allocation of functions within the disciplinary
process to avoid both the appearance and reality of improper influence
over the decision-making process. Concentrating control of these
systems under each state's highest court and separating prosecutorial
and adjudicative functions are essential to proper functioning.39 It is
likewise essential that state bar associations perform only administrative
functions and avoid adjudication by state bar officials.' ° Implementation
of these recommendations promotes public confidence in attorney
discipline systems, which is essential to the integrity of the legal
profession. The recommendations, each supported by the ABA and
members of the profession, may be implemented in systems unique to
each state.
Im. ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS IN
SELECT STATE DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
State disciplinary boards have utilized the recommendations of the
ABA in a variety of system structures. Colorado,4' Minnesota," and
Wisconsin43 offer examples of the diverse ways in which discipline
systems may be structured. This Comment compares these systems to
the Wisconsin regulation system for other professions which is
centralized under the Wisconsin Department of Regulation and
37. See supra text accompanying notes 9-18.
38. See eg., PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 14; MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7.
39. See, eg., PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, supra note 14; MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7;
Dubin, supra note 6.
40. See eg., MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7; Gallagher, supra note 31; Levin, supra note
18; Dubin, supra note 6.
41. See Linda Donnelly et al., How the New Attorney Regulation System Will Work, 28-
FEB COLO. LAW. 57 at 1-2 (1999).
42. Minn. St. Bar Assoc., Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Annual Report
(1999) available at<http:lwww.courts.state.mn.usllprb/olpr99ar.html> [hereinafter Minnesota
Report].
43. See SHARREN B. ROSE & JAMES L. MARTIN, SUPREME Cr. OF WIS., REGULATION
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN WISCONSIN FISCAL YEAR 1998-1999: REPORT OF THE
BOARD OF ATTORNEY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1999)(on file with the author).
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Licensing. The variety of discipline systems explored in this Part
illustrate the flexibility that is possible in accommodating the
characteristics described in Part II. The differences in the structure of
these systems may highlight areas for criticism which are discussed in
Part IV and addressed by suggested reform in Part V.
Colorado offers an excellent example of a recently reformed system.
The state implemented a new attorney discipline system in January
1999, replacing the former Grievance Committee structure with a
central intake system and Attorney Regulation Counsel, individual
attorneys who perform an investigative/prosecutorial function.44 The
Regulation Counsel makes recommendations to the Regulation
Committee, a board composed of six attorneys and three public
members,45 suggesting sanctions such as: dismissal, a letter of
admonition, or the filing of formal charges.4' The dismissal of charges by
the Regulation Counsel may be appealed to the Regulation Committee
which decides whether to act on the Regulation Counsel's
recommendation.47 Finally, formal charges are governed under the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and adjudicated by three-member
panels consisting of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge and two members
appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court from a pool of lawyers and
public members.' In this system, the prosecutorial function is performed
by the Regulation Committee, composed of one-third public members,49
and the adjudicative function is performed by a separate panel under
the control of the supreme court.'
In contrast to the Colorado system, the Minnesota attorney
discipline system utilizes bar association committees called District
Ethics Committees. These committees, which include members of the
public, perform investigative and prosecutorial functions.5 Adjudicative
hearings are presided over by three-member panels from the Lawyers
Professional Responsibility Board, that consists of twenty-three
members, fourteen of whom are attorneys and nine of whom are
members of the public.52 Individual board members hear appeals on a
44. See Donnelly, et al., supra note 41, at 57-58.
45. See id. at 58.
46. See id.
47. See id at 57.
48. See id at 58.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See Minnesota Report, supra note 42.
52. See id
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rotating basis." The Board performs the adjudicative function in this
system, leaving the investigative and prosecutorial functions to bar
association district ethics committees.
The Wisconsin attorney discipline system uses district committees
similar to those in the Minnesota system to perform its investigative
function.' The committees, which represent the public interest, consist
of both lawyer and non-lawyer members.' The investigative function is
coordinated by an administrator "over whom the [s]upreme [c]ourt has
the ultimate personnel authority."m The district committees generate
reports reflecting all exculpatory and inculpatory information that are
reviewed by the administrator.' If the administrator finds that the
grievance does not warrant dismissal, he or she prepares a report
regarding the investigation which is submitted to the Board together
with a recommendation regarding disposition of ihe grievance!" The
administrator's performance is supervised by the Board of Attorney
Professional Responsibility 9 which serves a prosecutorial function.'
Although the Board supervises the administrator, under the Wisconsin
Supreme Court's policies and procedures the Board is not permitted to
contact the investigative staff directly about investigative matters.61
Adjudicative responsibilities are handled by an individual referee from a
panel of referees established by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 2 The
court makes final rulings based on the decisions of the referees.6 In the
Wisconsin system, investigation is handled by District Ethics
Committees ("DECs"), prosecution is performed by the Board, and
adjudication is under the control of the court and its referees.
Attorney discipline boards are controversial in part because
members of the legal profession handle all of the functions in the
53. See i.
54. See ROSE & MARTIN, supra note 43.
55. See WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES: LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEM (Adopted Feb. 27, 1998) at 6 (on file with the
clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court and with the author).
56. Id. at 3.
57. See U at 4.
58. See iUi
59. See id. at 4.
60. See ROSE & MARTIN, supra note 43.
61. See Wis. Sup. Ct., supra note 55, at 8 (A member of the Board may not contact the
investigative or prosecutorial staff directly and privately in respect to investigatory matters
whether completed, pending, or contemplated, except about administrative matters).
62. See ROSE & MARTIN, supra note 43.
63. See id.
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regulatory systems. Other professions generally have adjudicative
boards composed of professional members, but these may be supervised
by another regulatory body. The Wisconsin Department of Regulation
and Licensing ("WDRL"), for example, oversees a number of
professional boards, including: the Accounting Examining Board,
Designers and Land Surveyors Board, Chiropractic Examining Board,
Dentistry Examining Board, Medical Examining Board, Board of
Nursing, Optometry Examining Board, Veterinary Examining Board,
and boards for Architects and Professional Engineers, among others."
The boards for each profession are housed within the WDRL, and
functions within the complaint process are delegated between the
WDRL staff and the individual regulation boards.6
The case-handling process of the WDRL involves four stages: the
intake stage, the investigation stage, the legal action stage, and the
hearing stage.6 Complaints received by the WDRL are referred to a
screening panel. The panel consists of members of the particular
credentialing authority, as well as the attorney supervisor and
investigator supervisor, who are both members outside the profession.
Stuart Engerman, the Investigative Staff Supervisor of the Division of
Enforcement of the WDRL, states, "The panel brings together the
professional expertise of the board members and the case handling [sic]
expertise of the department staff. "67 Fifty percent of cases are closed at
this stage, and complainants are notified of closures in writing.6s Cases
that are not closed are referred to a case handling team, which performs
the investigation function.69
Investigation within the WDRL occurs under a case advisor.0 Each
case is investigated by an investigator who reports to a case advisor. 1
After investigation, the case advisor may recommend closure of the case
along with specified reasons for closure.2 If the case advisor does not
recommend closure, the case proceeds to the legal action stage
64. See DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION AND LICENSING, STATE OF WIS., No. 1758,
REGULATION: IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE CONSUMER (1991).
65. See id.
66. See Stuart Engerman, Division of Enforcement, WIS. DEPT. OF REGULATION AND
LICENSING, The Case Handling Process (1999) (unpublished pamphlet on file with the
author).
67. Id. at 2.
68. See Id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 3.
71. See id.
72- See Engerman, supra note 66, at 3.
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regarding any issues warranting formal action."
In the legal action stage, the case advisor consults with the Division
of Enforcement ("DOE") attorney to exercise prosecutorial discretion
and either solve the case informally74 or prepare for a formal
administrative hearing. The DOE attorney files a formal complaint to
begin the formal hearing process. During the hearing stage, both the
complainant and the credential holder have a right to discovery.
Hearings are presided over by an administrative law judge of the
WDRL, who issues a proposed decision to the professional board.7 ' The
board issues a Final Decision and Order, which may be appealed to the
Circuit Court.?1
The Wisconsin Department of Regulation and Licensing serves an
administrative function for the many professional boards that it
oversees. The boards for each profession have input regarding the
substantive issues involved in complaints through the initial screening
and sentencing stages of the proceeding, while the investigation and
portions of the prosecution and adjudication functions are performed by
a member of the DOE.78 In this way, professions are allowed a measure
of self-regulation without the control over the entire discipline process
that generates much of the criticism of attorney discipline systems.
In contrast to the Wisconsin regulation system for other professions,
attorneys are highly involved in self-regulation through performance of
the investigative and prosecutorial functions. Self-regulation within a
system designed to protect the public may naturally lead to some level
of public suspicion regarding whether the profession places its own
interests above the public welfare." This is one reason disciplinary
proceedings are placed under the control of the judiciary.' However,
73. See id. at 4.
74. Informal resolution of cases may involve a stipulated agreement, an informal
settlement conference, and/or issuance of a letter of concern. See id. at 4. At this stage, an
expert witness may be consulted regarding whether practice standards have been violated.
The case advisor may reconsider closure based on the expert opinion. See id.
75. See Engerman, supra note 66, at 5.
76. See id,
77. See id.
7& See id.
79. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 31; HALT, AN ORGANIZATION OF AMERICANS FOR
LEGAL REFORM, Attorney Discipline National Survey and Report (1990); Levin, supra note
18.
80. See ABA COMM'N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, Report of
the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement to the A.B.A. House of Delegates
(May 1991) at iii-iv.
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additional procedural restraints on self-regulation, as well as public
participation, may be necessary to promote public confidence in
attorney discipline systems. This is evidenced by current criticisms of
attorney discipline procedures nation-wide.
IV. CRITICISMS OF STATE
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
Just as judicial control of attorney discipline systems has historically
been criticized,8' the general principle of attorney self-regulation has
been criticized. Much criticism of attorney discipline systems stems
from natural public distrust of its self-regulatory nature. The legal
profession is not alone in self-regulating. To some extent, all
professions are self-regulated.' One sociological theory, structural
functionalism, "views self-regulation as a necessary concomitant to
professionalism."'  From a structural functionalist perspective, self-
regulation is utilized by professions both to ensure appropriate
discipline and "to maintain necessary professional independence from
the state."'" Proponents of self-regulation explain that lawyers possess
both the specialized knowledge and unique understanding of problems
involved in legal practice which render them best equipped to address
these problems.' Critics find the practice of self-regulation an
unnecessary conflict of interest because many of the issues involved in
attorney discipline cases are easily understood by members outside of
the legal profession.' Distrust of self-regulation within the legal
profession is reflected more specifically in criticisms of attorney
discipline systems.
A. National Criticism of State Attorney Discipline Systems
While specific attorney discipline systems are frequently criticized at
the state level, more general nationwide critiques of attorney discipline
provide perspective on the general trends in perception of attorney
discipline. The first national review of attorney discipline systems was
81. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 31, at 493 ("[S]elf-regulation has traditionally been
considered theoretically central to the professional enterprise").
83. Id at 493.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 489.
86. See id. at 490.
[Vol. 84:273
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS
the Clark Report, published in 1970 by the ABA Special Committee
on the Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement, which criticized the lack
of coordination, guidance, and research in attorney discipline systems.'
The Clark Report was met with widespread reforms at the state level.89
Since then, the ABA and consumer advocate groups have continued to
critique the evolution of attorney discipline systems.
Criticism of attorney discipline procedures in the past decade has
labeled systems unresponsive to the public and more protective of
attorneys than of the public interest.90 A 1991 survey by HALT, for
example, summarizes that "the state of attorney discipline across the
country continues to be inexcusably irresponsible toward consumers...
[s]tate agencies serve neither consumers nor the legal profession
because of:... [s]ecrecy... [l]eniency... [d]elay... [u]nfair and
[u]responsive [p]rocess... [and] [flack of [p]ublic [p]articipation. 91
HALT cites that of the 93,000-plus complaints filed in 1988, over 85,000
were dismissed without action, and less than five percent resulted in
private reprimands or public discipline.2 HALT concludes that "[t]he
few lawyers who receive public discipline are usually thieves, felons, or
guilty of repeated misconduct." ''  Consumers are discouraged by
complaint responses stating that many disagreements and mistakes on
the part of attorneys do not amount to unethical conduct.' The public
interest concerns voiced by consumer advocate groups have been
addressed by members of the profession itself.
87. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
Problems and Recommendations in Disciplinary Enforcement (1970) [hereinafter CLARK
REPORT]; Gallagher, supra note 31, at 491.
88. See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7.
89. See, e.g., MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7; Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note 6;
Dubin, supra note 6; Gallagher, supra note 31; Levin, supra note 18.
90. The Legal profession's failure to protect the public is also affected by many factors
outside of professional discipline systems. See Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665 (1994) (suggesting that professional ideals must be improved
through market incentives and socialization efforts within law schools, law firms, and bar
associations, as well as administration of discipline systems).
91. HALT, supra note 79, at 2-3.
92. See id. at 17.
93. Id. at 19. For information on the response of attorney discipline systems to substance
abuse issues, see Nathaniel S. Currall, Note, The Cirrhosis of the Legal Profession-
Alcoholism as an Ethical Violation or Disease Within the Profession, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 739, (1999); Jeffrey J. Fleury, Comment, Kicking the Habit: Diversion in Michigan-
The Sensible Approach, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 11 (1995); Patricia Sue Heil, Comment,
Tending the Bar in Texas: Alcoholism as a Mitigating Factor in Attorney Discipline, 24 ST.
MARY'S LJ. 1263 (1993).
94. See HALT, supra note 79, at 35.
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Academics within the legal profession echo HALT's claims that
state discipline systems currently fail to protect the public.95 Leslie C.
Levin, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut
School of Law, blames the failure of discipline systems to protect the
public on a lack of standards for imposition of sanctions:
[T]he lack of well-defined standards, the tendency to impose
non-public sanctions on lawyers, the failure to publicize the
"public" sanctions, and the amount of recidivism that seems to
occur, also raise serious questions about how well the sanctions
imposed on lawyers achieve the basic goals of lawyer discipline:
protection of the public, protection of the administration of
justice and preservation of confidence in the legal profession.96
Levin cites that only about five percent of all complaints result in
discipline,' and that the sanctions imposed "are often light and
inconsistent."" The statistic is alarming to both the public and members
of the profession because it reflects the small percentage of concerns
that are addressed by current systems. A large number of concerns that
the public takes seriously enough to file complaints are not deemed
worthy of disciplinary attention. Levin offers an outcome-based
assessment of state systems, pointing to structural flaws as the source of
lenient treatment.
As evidence of lenient treatment, Levin points to the predominance
of private admonitions' and the use of such brief suspensions that
attorneys may continue to practice." Levin explains that the
predominance of "light treatment" is due to a lack of uniform standards
that leaves decisions to the discretion of attorneys involved in the
discipline process:'O'
Indeed, in many states, lawyers-not judges-continue to impose
most lawyer discipline and their determinations often are not
reviewed by courts. Even when a court does review these
95. See Dubin, supra note 6; Levin, supra note 18.
96. Levin, supra note 18, at 5-6 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 8-9.
98. Id. at 9.
99. See id. at 46 (Levin notes that "[f]rom the public's perspective, admonitions permit
lawyers to be treated leniently behind closed doors and deprive the public of information
about a lawyer's full disciplinary history.")
100. See id.
101. Id.
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determinations, they may be afforded great deference. Who you
are, where you practice, and who you know can directly affect
the severity of the sanction imposed and the lawyer's ability to
continue the practice of law. °2
The use of "light treatment," including the use of private
admonitions, is designed to protect the accused attorney's reputation in
cases where the misconduct is minor or causes little or no injury."
However, Levin points out that the public needs protection from the
types of misconduct that warrant these sanctions and that these practices
"effectively value[] the lawyer's reputation over the protection of the
public."'"1° Even if the minor misconduct discussed does not directly
harm the client, failure of the legal profession to address such conduct
creates public perception of a disciplinary system that is self-preserving.
As a profession dedicated to serving the public by definition, attorneys
have an obligation to address the concerns of the public. If the
profession does not have the trust and respect of the public, it cannot
effectively serve that public.
Levin suggests strict standards for imposition of sanctions as a
solution to the disparity between misconduct and sanctions. This
remedy addresses the "symptom" of disparate treatment but fails to
address the greater problem of bias inherent in the self-regulation
system, or public perception of such bias. While standards for the
imposition of sanctions are necessary to consistent application of ethics
rules, attorney self-regulation systems must be structured to combat
inherent bias, such as suggested in Parts II and V.
The ABA recognizes problems of self-interested behavior and
unresponsiveness as well, especially when state bar associations perform
many of the functions of the discipline system."° The ABA Disciplinary
Commission states that regulation by bar officials, often involved in the
formal disciplinary process, creates "the appearance of conflicts of
102. Id. at 10-11.
103. See iL at 46.
104. Id.
105. State Bars commonly administer many functions of the disciplinary process,
although the systems are under the ultimate control of the judiciary. See, e.g., About the
Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, available at
<http:llwww.courts.state.mn.us/lprb/abtlprb.html>; Gallagher, supra note 31; Roy M.
Sobelson, Legal Ethics, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 48 MERCER L. REv. 387 (1996); A
National Action Plan on Lawyer Conduct and Professionalism, Adopted January 21, 1999, by
the Conference of Chief Justices [hereinafter A NATIONAL ACMION PLAN].
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interest and the appearance of impropriety.'0 6 The Commission also
reports that some jurisdictions dismiss up to ninety percent of
complaints as failing to allege unethical conduct,'0 that the reasonable
expectations of clients are not addressed by existing systems,'O' and that
"there is significant distrust of the fairness and impartiality of self-
regulation."' 09  Thus, national criticism of disciplinary systems from
consumer advocates, academics, and the ABA suggests that
unresponsiveness, inadequacy, and public perception remain concerns in
a variety of different procedural systems.
B. Criticism of Specific State Discipline Systems
Across the country at the state level, criticisms are similar. In
Wisconsin, newspapers last fall announced that distrust of attorney
discipline systems was well-founded. They reported that the Wisconsin
Board of Attorney Professional Responsibility had been criticized by its
own administrative staff as protective of attorneys"' and unfair,"' and
that the ABA had found the system "less consumer friendly than it
might be.,112  Similar reports stated that members were accused of
making lawyer-friendly decisions,1 becoming involved in cases in which
there was a conflict of interest, 4 and improperly influencing
investigations. 5 While the Board's administrative committee denied
the allegations, a negative impression on the public had already been
made. In response, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reassessed the entire
discipline system, a process that involved both a public hearing in review
of the system 17 and review by an ABA Discipline System Assistance
Team.
106. MCKAY REPORT, supra note 7, at 1.
107. See u at ii.
108. See id
109. Id. at 23.
110. See Jones, supra note 3, at 2.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See Segall, supra note 2, at lB.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See Wisconsin Supreme Court, In the Matter of Review of the Lawyer Disciplinary
System, Order No. 99-03 dated October 1, 1999 (on file with clerk of Wisconsin Supreme
Court).
118. See ABA, Preliminary Draft of the Report on the Wisconsin Lawyer Disciplinary
System (Sept. 1999)(on file with the author and the clerk of the Wisconsin Supreme Court).
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Although it was apparent that the Wisconsin Supreme Court was
prepared to make changes in the disciplinary process, journalists
continued to warn the public of its inadequacies! 9 A December 1999
article criticized the discipline system, citing that only two-tenths of one
percent of complaints lead to public discipline" and that the process
"[is] cloaked in secrecy"." The article further noted:
Want to find out how many complaints have been filed against a
particular attorney? You can't, unless the offenses were
egregious enough to send to the high court for review. Want to
know if your attorney has ever been reprimanded by the state
board? Again, you can't, unless the board decides to issue a
relatively rare public reprimand-or the attorney does something
really bad later and gets sent up before the Supreme Court,
which opens up the lawyer's disciplinary file."
The article states that many attorneys consider the discipline system
a "big joke""2 and explains that habitual offenders face no specific limit
on the number of violations allowed before their ability to practice is
threatened." In Wisconsin, as in many other states, the attorney
discipline system must continually combat criticism with policies that
inspire public confidence.
Similar levels of public dissatisfaction in California led the state
legislature to investigate their discipline system in the early 1990s.
Investigators found the system "slow, unresponsive, and overly-
protective of the interests of lawyers rather than the public interest.""
Criticism of the California system at that time focused on the fact that
the system was largely run by the State Bar and that the organized bar
was unable to promote the public interest over the professional interest
of its attorneys. 6 The California critique focused on the familiar
question of the "legitimacy of lawyer self-regulation."'" While the
California system was dramatically altered, the State Bar actually
119. See Tim Kelly, The Lawyer Protection Agency: Being a Bad Attorney May be a Low
Risk Profession, SHEPHERD EXPRESS METRO, Dec. 16-22,1999, at 12.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. l.
124. See id.
125. Gallagher, supra note 31, at 490.
126. See id. at 491.
127. Id.
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expanded its authority.'8 Increased funding, organization and staff were
implemented to increase the system's efficacy.' As in California,
criticism at both the national and state level is often accompanied by
suggestions to improve both the public image and efficacy of discipline
systems.
V. MEETING THE CONCERNS OF THE PUBLIC
The consumer focus in lawyer discipline is a relatively new idea, the
first evidence of which was the 1970 ABA Clark Report on the status of
disciplinary enforcement against lawyers."3 Some scholars suggest that
historical events of the 1970s served as the impetus for reform. 3' The
Nixon impeachment scandal, in implicating the United States Attorney
General and other government officials, shook public confidence in the
justice system and the legal profession." Another suggestion is that
social factors leading to public distrust of the legal profession began in
the late 1960s with the civil rights movement, as the role of the legal
profession in upholding a racist social system in the South became
suspect, '33 and continued to worsen into the 1970s:
128. See i&
129. In the years following these reforms, California State Bar dues increased steadily.
See Steve Albert, Disipline Doesn't Come Easy; Better but Still Flawed, the State Bar's
Disciplinary System Struggles to Improve While Facing Possible Cuts, RECORDER, May 9,
1994, at 1. In 1994, over seventy percent of the Bar's almost fifty six million dollar budget was
dedicated to attorney discipline. See id. Then, in 1997, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed a
funding bill that would have mandated a fee of $458 per attorney for 1998. See Mike McKee,
RECORDER, Dec. 8, 1999, at In Brief. The Bar continued to operate some programs on the
seventy-seven dollar fee authorized by statute, assisted by an emergency assessment of $173
per attorney, authorized by the California Supreme Court. See Howard Mintz, Calif High
Court Issues Emergency Order to Help State Bar Police Lawyers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Dec. 3, 1998. The funding crisis appears to be over, as the State Bar adopted a year 2000
budget of $ 82.3 million. Mike McKee, THE RECORDER, December 8, 1999, at In Brief. For
more information on the California budget crisis, see Steve Albert, Better But Still Flawed, the
State Bar's Disciplinary System Struggles to Improve While Facing Possible Cuts, THE
RECORDER, May 9, 1994, at 1; David Kline, Davis Focuses on Education, Doesn't Mention
State Bar, Law Matters in His First State of State Address, METROPOLITAN NEWS-
ENTERPRISE, January 7, 1999, at 1; David Kline, Supreme Court to Consider State Bar's
Request Todaydeck- Meanwhile, 'Stopgap' Bill Amended to Protect State Bar Employees,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE, June 24, 1998, at 1; Mike McKee, THE RECORDER,
Dec. 8, 1999 at In Brief; Greg Mitchell, Court Orders $173 Dues for Attorney Discipline, THE
RECORDER, Dec. 4, 1998, at 1; Howard Mintz, Calif. High Court Issues Emergency Order to
Help State Bar Police Lawyers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 3,1998.
130. CLARK REPORT, supra note 87.
131. See Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 359.
132. See id.
133. See Gallagher, supra note 31, at 532-33 (citing JEROLD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL
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Disenchantment with the American policy in Vietnam also
contributed to general disrespect for numerous social
institutions, including the legal profession. There were
increasing pressures on the bar to conform its actual behavior to
its professed high ideals of public service and equal justice.
Watergate especially... provided a glaring example of the
failure of professional values, since most of those involved in the
Nixon administration scandal, including the president himself,
were lawyers.'
During this turbulent decade, the three-year ABA investigation and
ensuing report involved myriad suggestions for reform, including: more
adequate funding," centralized systems,"6 term limitations for
disciplinary agency members," adequate staffing," abolition of
required complaint verification," and grievant immunity." The
criticism of the 1970s was met with reform, but scrutiny of attorney
discipline systems has continued for three decades.
States have responded to decades of criticism in ways as diverse as
the systems they are designed to improve. Some recent successful
reforms involve consumer assistance/intake systems to initially field
complaints and public participation in the investigative, prosecutorial,
and/or adjudicative aspects of the disciplinary process.
A. Consumer Assistance/Central Intake Programs
Georgia was one of the first states to experiment with a central
intake system in June of 1995.4' The State Bar of Georgia reasoned that
a majority of complaints were dismissed as nondisciplinary in nature,
and this was a source of "substantial public disillusionment and
JusTIcE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 263-306 (1976)).
134. Id. at 533 (citation omitted).
135. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 87, at 20.
136. See id. at 26.
137. See id at 39.
138. See id. at 49.
139. See iU at 71.
140. See iU at 74.
141. See Sobelson, supra note 105.
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dissatisfaction with the lawyer discipline process."'42 In response, the
Consumer Assistance Program was created with the purpose of
"resolv[ing] as many nondisciplinary complaints as possible through
conciliation, negotiation, and education... [or through referral] to
ancillary services or agencies, such as Fee Arbitration, the Lawyer
Assistance Program, the Clients' Security Fund, lawyer referral services,
and the like."'43
In 1996, the Mercer Law Review reported a positive response to the
new system.'" In its first year of operation, the Consumer Assistance
Program handled almost four thousand phone calls, ' actively handled
sixty percent of the cases,'" and resolved twenty-six percent of the cases
without referral.4 7 In addition, the numbers of both requests for
grievance forms and grievances filed decreased during the first year of
the Consumer Assistance Program's operation." Decreased complaints
show public satisfaction with the handling of minor disputes. In turn,
fewer formal complaints by the public improve the reputation of the
profession. Georgia's Consumer Assistance Program is a successful
model for other state discipline systems desiring to improve their
efficiency and consumer focus.
Consumer Assistance/Central Intake systems have been adopted by
a number of states following Georgia's successful example. In January
of 1999, in response to an extensive review process, Colorado
implemented a new attorney discipline system with an education and
rehabilitation emphasis. 4 9 One of the most dramatic changes to the
system was implementation of a Central Intake System for referring
matters not covered by the disciplinary system to appropriate
programs."'
Diversion through this program is optional on the part of the
attorney' and may involve informal resolution of the conflict or referral
to an appropriate program.52 Programs for referral include mediation,
142. Id. at 387.
143. Id. at 388.
144. See id
145. See id at 388.
146. See Sobelson, supra note 105, at 388.
147. See id
148. See id.
149. See Donnelly et al., supra note 41, at 58.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id
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fee arbitration, ethics school, attorney assistance programs, or the
Colorado Lawyer's Health Program." Ethics school is a previously
established program offering general legal ethics training and office
management skills training, while the Colorado. Lawyer's Health
Program aids attorneys with substance abuse or mental health issues."5
Successful completion of any of the diversion options results in a
dismissal of the grievance by the Colorado Office of Attorney
Regulation Counsel. 55
The result of the Central Intake System on the Colorado disciplinary
process is a reduction in the number of cases docketed for investigation
under the formal disciplinary process' m Linda Donelly, Justice Rebecca
Love Kourlis and Justice Michael L. Bender explain that:
The new attorney regulation system shifts the emphasis from
punishment to prevention. It will better protect the public as
well as educate attorneys. The process will reduce delay and
focus resources on the more serious cases filed... [t]he court has
completely overhauled the attorney regulation process to make it
more helpful to... the public and to ensure that it operates
efficiently and expeditiously."
In Colorado, the public image of the attorney discipline system has
been improved by meeting the needs of many consumers previously not
addressed by the formal discipline process. The Central Intake System
addresses minor misconduct such as fee disputes and poor office
management skills, and in the process, demonstrates the legal system's
commitment to serving the public.-8
As recently as 1999, screening and direction as handled by a Central
Intake System have been recommended by the judiciary as a way to
improve complaint handling in attorney discipline systems, leading to
more effective lawyer regulation.'59 Recommendation (D)(1) of the
Conference of Chief Justices states in part:
The disciplinary agency, or central intake office if separate,
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See Donnelly et al., supra note 41, at 58.
156. See id. at 57.
157. 1d. at 59 (emphasis added).
158. See id.
159. See A NATIONAL ACrON PLAN, supra note 105.
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should review complaints expeditiously. Matters that do not fall
under the jurisdiction of the disciplinary agency or do not state
facts that, if true, would constitute a violation of the rules of
professional conduct should be promtly referred to a more
appropriate mechanism for resolution.'p
The recommendations go on to suggest that minor misconduct
should be referred to the programs to which central intake generally
refers:
The state's system of lawyer regulation should include
procedures for referring matters involving lesser misconduct to
an appropriate remedial program. Such procedures may include:
-Required participation in a law office management program;
-Required participation in a lawyer assistance program;
-Enrollment in an "ethics school" or other mandatory CLE; and
-Participation in a fee arbitration or mediation program.1
The development of Consumer Assistance/Central Intake Programs
is supported by the growing number of states that have successfully
implemented such systems and representatives of the judiciary, as
improving the efficacy of attorney discipline systems.
A majority of the complaints surrounding state lawyer discipline
systems relate to claims of self-serving within the profession and
dismissal of claims that the public feels are valid. The development of
Consumer Assistance/Central Intake Systems allows states to meet
these claims without a dramatic overhaul of the formal discipline
process, and without reallocation of the functions within the system.
Self-regulation, through either the investigative or prosecutorial
functions, may be a legitimate way to regulate attorneys and serve the
public as long as there is some alternate system for resolving complaints
that do not reach the level of misconduct requiring formal discipline.
The Consumer Assistance/Central Intake Systems models of Georgia
and Colorado meet the public desire to have less serious concerns
addressed through the attorney discipline system. At the same time,
formal procedures may be conducted by attorneys who are best
equipped to investigate and prosecute the types of problems or
160. Id. at 34.
161. Id. at 35 (quoting Recommendation (D)(2)).
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misconduct that arise within the profession.
B. Public Involvement in State Disciplinary Proceedings
Another way to safeguard the public, largely within the scope of
present state attorney discipline systems, is the use of members of the
public in some or all of the steps in the process. Public criticism stems
from "closed" systems of discipline that purportedly hide
inconsistencies, cronyism, and lenient sanctions behind a veil of
secrecy."a The most logical way to dispel those criticisms is to allow
members of the public into the discipline system6' Such policies allow
discipline boards the benefit of the perspective of public members in
difficult discipline decisions. Public criticism of the system is less
formidable when the public is scrutinizing decisions of its own members
who are disinterested in the preservation of reputations or careers
within the legal profession. Many states utilize public membership in
one or several stages of the discipline process.
In California, the "[S]tate Bar... self-regulates as an adjunct of the
judicial branch of government."' 6' However, non-lawyer members have
been a part of the discipline board since 1976,1 and non-lawyer
members also perform an important oversight function. In 1987, the
Bar established the Complainants' Grievance Panel to review cases
initially dismissed by the intake staff.1 6 Members of the public compose
almost half of the Panel. 67 The Complainants' Grievance Panel has the
authority to review those cases and initiate further investigation or to
162. See, eg., Gallagher, supra note 31; HALT, supra note 79; Levin, supra note 18;
Kelly, supra note 119.
163. Discipline proceedings become a matter of public record at different stages of the
process, varying by state. For discussion of open records policies, see William Wesley Patton,
Publication, Depublication and Review of State Bar Court Opinions: Bringing the Public into
the Process, 17 WHrIrIER L. REV. 409 (1996); Powell, supra note 6, at 263 (1996); Lisa M.
Stem, The Survey of New York Practice" Code of Professional Responsibility, 70 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 839 (1996); Mark E. Hopkins, Note, Open Attorney Discipline: New Jersey Supreme
Court's Decision to Make Attorney Disciplinary Procedures Public-What it Means to
Attorneys and to the Public, 27 RUTGERS LJ. 757 (1996); Kristina Serafini Pennex, Note,
Lifting the Veil of Secrecy by Opening Michigan's Disciplinary System, 73 U. DET. MERCY L.
REV. 569 (1996).
164. Gallagher, supra note 31, at 488.
165. See id. at 566.
166. See id. at 597.
167. See id. The Panel membership is composed of four lawyers and three non-lawyers.
The non-lawyer members are appointed by the Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, and
the Senate Committee on rules. See idt
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recommend the filing of formal charges.'6
The Panel may review the disciplinary process in two ways. First, it
may review closed bar investigations when requested by a
complainant.'69 Second, the Panel may randomly audit closed cases."
This unique role is intended to protect the public, but has posed some
difficulties in implementation.' For example, prosecutors point out
that the Panel views cases out of context and challenges the
prosecutorial discretion of the investigative staff, creating additional
pressure in an overworked system.' The Panel agrees with the decisions
made by other offices over seventy percent of the time, and has been
found valuable in highlighting problems within the discipline system.'7
The importance of the public review element is evident in the
approximately thirty percent rate of disagreement upon review. This
number represents the disparity between successful outcomes based on
the public's perspective and that of the legal profession. The number
suggests that the Panel serves as a useful check within the system, and
may be used to gauge the success of other efforts to improve the system.
California's approach to public participation in the disciplinary
system is unique in preserving the right to self-regulation and largely
reserving prosecutorial discretion for lawyer members. The Panel adds
a distinct oversight role to the discipline process, rather than taking over
a role previously filled by attorneys. In the process, the Panel provides
valuable insight into the efficacy of the process and suggestions for
continual improvement.
In New Jersey, the disciplinary system underwent a dramatic series
of changes from 1979 to 1996, under the leadership of Robert Wilentz as
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court." Justice Wilentz
strongly believed in the importance of public satisfaction with the legal
profession' and strove to achieve this in part through public
participation in most aspects of the disciplinary process.
168. See Gallagher, supra note 31, at 597.
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172 See id.
173. See id. at 598-99.
174. See Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note 6. For more information on Chief Justice
Wilentz, see Ronald J. Fleury et al., How Robert Wilentz Changed the Courts, 7 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 411 (1997), reprinted from N.J.L.J., July 29, 1996, at 1, with permission.
175. See Ambrosio & McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 380.
176. See id. at 380-81.
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Two aspects of the system involving members of the public are the
DECs and the Disciplinary Review Board ("DRB")." The DECs
perform initial investigation and prosecution functions. 8 The DECs
consist of at least eight members, two of whom must be public members,
and DEC hearing panels are three members, one of whom must be a
public member.'9 The DRB has appellate jurisdiction and also utilizes
members of the public."f The DRB includes nine members, at least
three of whom are members of the public, and all members are
appoint&d- by the supreme court for three year terms.'8' Public
membership is essential to the functioning of the New Jersey
disciplinary system." The New Jersey Supreme Court has noted:
We increase public participation despite the obvious specialized
nature of these matters that often require legal training for full
understanding; we do so because of our belief that the public has
something valuable to contribute to the process and to increase
the confidence of the public in this important aspect of our
system of justice."f
Chief Justice Wilentz dedicated his seventeen-year tenure to
improving public opinion of the legal profession;'m he found public
participation in the discipline process an integral part of meeting that
goal, as evidenced by his reforms in this area."
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 374-75.
180. See id. at 378.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 381 (quoting Supreme Court of New Jersey Administrative Determinations
Relating to the 1993 Report of the New Jersey Ethics Commission July 14,1994.
184. Chief Justice Wilentz expressed this goal best himself, at the Law Day ceremonies
at the New Jersey Law Center in 1994:
The bar is not loved; it is not appreciated or understood, and one message therefore
on today's rededication [sic] ... risks being lost .... It is a message of the
importance of attorneys, their importance to our system of justice and to society.
And it is a message of their dedication and their honesty. I'd like to help deliver
that message since practicing law was once my life.
Id. at 361-62 (quoting Supreme Court of New Jersey Administrative Determinations Relating
to the 1993 Report of the New Jersey Ethics Commission July i4, 1994, reprinted in NJ.L.J.,
July 18, 1994, at 51).
185. See id.
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For states that do not utilize public participation in the disciplinary
process, criticism follows. In Michigan, for instance, public participation
in the disciplinary system was one of the main suggestions in a recent
law review article calling for reforms to "better protect the public.
'1 6
Lawrence A. Dubin, a professor at the University of Detroit Mercy
School of Law and former chair of the Michigan Attorney Grievance
Committee," states that based on the Disciplinary Board's 1995
Report,'8' there were 4000 requests for disciplinary investigations, while
only 196 orders of discipline were entered against attorneys in
Michigan. Dubin suggests several reforms to improve the system,
including increased inclusion of public membership in the disciplinary
process."9
The Michigan Attorney Disciplinary Board has as its trier of fact
hearing panels consisting of three attorneys.191 The panels act by
majority vote and require a quorum of two members."n Dubin suggests
that the membership of the panels consist of two attorneys and one
public member, as the Michigan Attorney Grievance Commission
suggested in 1986.' Dubin points out that implementation of this
suggestion would serve the ultimate goal of protecting the public and
that such a policy is recommended under the ABA standards for
attorney discipline systems.194 The Michigan system currently utilizes
members of the public on both its Attorney Grievance Commission,
which handles the investigative and prosecutorial functions, and
Attorney Discipline Board, which is responsible for performing the
adjudicative functions within the system.95
The 1999 Conference of Chief Justices also supports public
participation in the discipline process. Under the heading of public
outreach, the Justices state, in part:
The participation of the public should be supported in all levels
186. Dubin, supra note 6.
187. Id. at 701.
188. 1995 Mich. Atty. Disc. Bd. and Atty. Griev. Comm. Joint Ann. Rep.
189. See Dubin, supra note 6.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 676.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id. See also A.B.A., Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary
Enforcement to the American Bar Association (May, 1991).
195. See Dubin, supra note 6, at 676.
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of court and bar institutional policy-making by judges, lawyers,
and bar programs. Judges, lawyers, and bar programs should:
- Publicize the nomination and appointment process for public
representatives on court and bar committees;
. Once appointed, provide lay members access to the tools
necessary for effective participation.1 6
The comment to the suggestion notes that public members bring a
"fresh perspective"'19 and "common sense,"' 98 and notes that public
members should not only participate, but have the tools to participate
actively."l The judiciary, which properly controls the disciplinary
system, thus supports public participation as adding depth and
perspective to the discipline process, both of which support the goals of
attorney discipline.
Public participation in one or more of the investigative,
prosecutorial, adjudicative, or oversight functions improves the public
image of attorney discipline systems in two ways. First, discipline
systems that utilize public members dispel the image of cronyism and
self-serving among members of the legal profession in self-regulation.'
Second, members of the public add a valuable perspective on the
public's expectations and needs regarding the legal profession."1 Their
presence on disciplinary boards ensures that the public is protected
through impartial decision-making. The many ways that public
members are introduced into the disciplinary process in California, New
Jersey, and Michigan show that at any stage in the process, public
membership may be used to ensure fair decision-making and public
confidence in the system.
Self-regulation by the legal profession is criticized and distrusted,
both by the public and by members of the profession. Attorney
discipline systems have been publicly criticized for the last three
decades, notably beginning in 1970 with the ABA Clark Report, which
called for widespread reforms. Since then, many states have made a
196. A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 105, at 41.
197. i
19& i
199. See U
200. See, eg., Dubin, supra note 6.
201. See, e.g., A NATIONAL ACTION PLAN, supra note 105.
202. CLARK REPORT, supra note 87.
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variety of changes in their disciplinary system structures to address
criticism and better protect the public.
This Comment offers three essential characteristics of effective
attorney discipline systems: judicial control, strictly separated
prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and adjudication independent
of state bar associations. Examples of select discipline systems, including
one state's approach to regulating other professions,' illustrate the
many ways discipline systems may be organized under the general guide
of these characteristics.
Recently, state discipline systems have continued to be criticized for
failure to protect the public and for promoting the interests of the
profession above those of the public. Many of these criticisms may be
addressed without radical structural change of the present systems,
through the implementation of Consumer Assistance/Central Intake
programs and improved public participation in different aspects of the
discipline process. Central Intake Systems address public concerns
through alternative referrals and hold attorneys accountable for minor
misconduct without damaging important professional reputations
through formal discipline. Public participation in the discipline process
is important to effective and impartial functioning of the process. Both
appropriate intake systems and public participation improve the efficacy
of and promote public confidence in state attorney discipline systems.
Both the public and professional groups will continue to scrutinize
methods of self regulation by the legal profession. To preserve its
effectiveness, the profession must dispel poor public perception with
policies that truly protect the public as well as the integrity of the legal
profession.
JENNIFER M. KRAUS*
203. See Engerman, supra note 66.
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